공산주의자들의 11개 목표 공표

PART I SOUTH KOREA From: 111200/I June 48 To : 181200/I June 48 Headquarters, USAFIK Seoul, Korea 18 June 1948 No. 144 A. ARMED FORCES 2. Operational Activity (Confidential) b. Constabulary action on CHEJU DO The Constabulary completed operation Order Number 4. Fifty-three prisoners wore taken, 4 raiders were killed attempting to escape and raider supply points containing about 2 tons of miscellaneous supplies were captured. The island commander believes that operations in the mountains are complete. 2. Communist Aims and Operating Procedure South KOREA's reorganizing communist minority is presently emphasizing new, old and seasonal aims with the intent to engage in active anti-government operations. The 11 aims listed below have been discussed in clandestine meetings and publicized surreptitiously since the communist failure to negate the 10 May elections: 1. "Eliminate" all rightists in the National Assembly. 2. "Eliminate" all rightists who cooperate with or work for Military Government. 3. "Oppose" the summer grain collection. 4. "Oppose" the sale of vested farm lands to the farmers. (Communists advocate confiscation of land from large property holders without compensation, and free re-distribution of this land to the farmers as has been done on a large scale in North KOREA.) 5. "Oppose" the South Korean government. 6. "Oppose" recruiting for the Constabulary. (Communists term this recruiting "forced mobilization.") 7. "Support" the political view of anti-separate government as voiced by Rightist KIM Koo and Middle-Roader KIM Kyu Sik. 8. "Support" the "people's fight" on CHEJU-DO. 9. "Demand" the immediate withdrawal of both armies from KOREA. 10. "Demand" the release of patriots from jails. 11. "Demand" more rations. · B-2 information claims that SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY operational orders, already issued, call for the organization of three-man fighting groups which are to collect weapons to be used in fighting for the above aim. Examples of assignments are: blacksmiths and jewelers are to make hand grenades, employees of trucking companies are to obtain gasoline for sabotage purposes, and in at least one province each communist is to report the names and movements of at least eight rightists and employees of Military Government. C-3 information reports that current operational instructions remind communists that "the manner of fighting should exhibit great cruelty"... "it is a victory for us to sacrifice 10 persons for one policeman." S. Civil Unrest a. At least 29 people died in South KOREA this week as communist assassins struck at rightists, and as police ran down and fought small battles with communist squads. Among those assassinated this week was Colonel PAK Chin Kyung, Commanding Officer of the Korean Constabulary forces on CHEJU-DO and an outstanding combat leader. His assassin escaped. b. Weekly Violence Summary A summary of acts of violence involving communists for the week as reported up to 18 June is as follows: Soul [illegible] Kyong [illegible] Chungchong Cholla do [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Total Attacks on towns | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 1 Attacks on police | | | | 2 | | | | | | 2 Police killed | | | | 6 | | | | 10 5 21 Communists killed | | | | | | | | | | | Rightists killed | | | | 4 | | 1 | 2 1 8 Demonstrations, disorders, | | | | | | | | | 3 1 4 arson, & attacks on rightists | | | | | | | | | | | Attacks on | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 government buildings | | | | | | | | | | | Sabotage (communications) | | | | | | | | | | | Sabotage (RR lines) | | | | | | | | | | | Sabotage (roads) | | | | | | | | | | | Sabotage (bridges) | | | | | | | | | | | Sabotage (power) | | | | | | | | | | | Strikes (labor) | | | | | | | | | | | Strikes (schools) | | | | | | | | | | | D. PSYCHOLOGICAL The Press - Public Opinion 3. Japanese in KOREA: For approximately two weeks, beginning with a report from PUSAN that certain former Japanese officials in KOREA had returned to the peninsula for some mysterious (but no good) purpose, Korean newspapers have printed scores of articles which again aggravated fears that the Japanese were preparing to resume control over KOREA under U.S. auspices. The reports spread so rapidly and grew to such proportions that many Koreans, whose gullibility is unlimited with respect to the Japanese potential for treachery, placed some degree of credence in stories that Japanese troops were being used in current CHEJU-DO operations and that the aircraft involved in the LLAFCOURT ROCKS incident were piloted by Japanese.