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HEADQUARTERS KOREAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP APO 235 The Honorable Kenneth C Royall Secretary of the Army Department of Defense Washington 25, D C Dear Mr Royall: This folio presents a picture of the history, organization, strength and composition of the Korean Security Forces. A description of the present operations of the Korean Security Forces against subversive elements on the mainland and the island of Cheju do is also presented. Logistical data reflect the present status of supply and the problems involved. These may be considered as "extension of remarks" which, if desired, may serve as a refresher or as data which cannot be easily remembered. Sincerely yours, W L ROBERTS Brigadier General, U S Army Chief 7 Incls: 5 incl: Korean Army 1 incl: Korean Navy 1 incl: Korean Police WLRiee 7 January 1949 첨부 1. 국방경비대의 역사 Annex 1. HISTORY OF THE KOREAN CONSTABULARY Period October 1945 through December 1945 On 22 October 1945, Colonel Argo was assigned Director, Department of National Defense. Under the supervision of Lt Col Green, the Seoul English Language School was established. This school consisted of approximately 60 Korean ex-military men who - upon graduation - constituted the Officer cadre for the Korean Constabulary. Period January 1946 through March 1946 Military Government Ordinance #86 authorized the organization of a Bureau of Constabulary, authorized strength 25,000 Officers and men; and a Bureau of Coast Guard, strength 3,000 Officers and men. The first six graduates of the Seoul Language School were commissioned in the grade of 2nd Lieutenant. 15 January 1946, Lt Col Marshal assumed duties as Chief, Korean Constabulary. Eight United States Army Officers were assigned to the Bureau of Constabulary. These Officers received a brief orientation and with a minimum of directives, departed for the provincial capitols of South Korea. These Officers were given the mission of setting up Regimental Headquarters and organizing Regiments by local recruiting. Funds, food, clothing and equipment for this adventure were lacking - almost non-existent. Period March 1946 through May 1946 In March 1946, Lt Col Barros relieved Lt Col Marshal and assumed the duties of Chief, Korean Constabulary. During March and April, recruiting in the field gave the Korean Constabulary a strength of 3,000 Officers and men. In May 1946, Colonel Terrill E Price relieved Colonel Argo and became Director, Department of National Defense. Due to many internal matters - political and others - there was very little enthusiasm for a Korean Army as such. This, coupled with the fact that both the Americans and the Koreans hoped for a united Korea, put the Korean Constabulary off to a poor start. Period June 1946 through August 1946 During this period the Korean Constabulary remained at almost a standstill. In June the Department of National Defense was re-named Department of Internal Security. An Officers' Training School was started for the purpose of training Cadets for commissions in the Constabulary. Five additional American Officers were assigned to the Department of Internal Security. Three of these Officers wore assigned to the Bureau of Constabulary and were sent to the field to command Regiments. Period September 1946 through November 1946 In September 1946 a decision was made to advance the organization of Constabulary Headquarters and to accelerate the recruiting program. Captain Hausman was assigned Executive Officer to the Chief, Korean Constabulary. Captain Hausman's assignment was for the purpose of organizing Headquarters, Constabulary. At the end of this period, Constabulary strength had risen to 5,000 Officers and men. 12 November 1946, the 9th Regiment was activated on the island of Cheju. Period December 1946 through February 1947 By December, Constabulary Headquarters was organized along the lines of an Infantry Division Headquarters. At this time, Major General Lerch, Military Governor of Korea decided to give the Koreans broader powers in running their government. In the Constabulary, the Americans became Advisors and the Koreans became Commanders, certain necessary control remaining with the Americans. Major Lee Heung Koon was appointed Acting Chief of Constabulary. During the latter part of December and continuing for 7 weeks, Major Lee and Captain Hausman made an extensive field trip for the purpose of accelerating organization of the Regiments and procuring additional areas to permit the Regiments to go to full strength. Many difficulties were encountered in this trip. Properties had to be located, their titles searched and much other red tape pursued and defeated before the properties could be turned over to the Korean Constabulary. In January, Major Song Ho Seung (later promoted to Colonel, then Brigadier General) was assigned as the first Chief of Korean Constabulary. In this period, progress was notable; Constabulary strength grew from 5,000 to 8,000. The main interest of Military Government at this time was the Korean National Police and the National Youth Movement. This was a start of bad feelings among Youth organizations, Korean Police and the Constabulary. It was also the beginning of a chain of serious incidents between the Police and Constabulary. Period March 1947 through May 1947 Organization and recruiting continued favorably with the strength of the Constabulary reaching 10,000 by mid-April. Police-Constabulary relations became more strained, culminating in the Yongam incident. In this incident, one company of Constabulary from the 4th Regiment, Cholla Namdo, made a motor march to Yongam and attacked the police station. Both sides suffered several casualties. In both organizations, on National level, the Korean Commanders and the American Advisors held conferences and exerted every effort to better the relations between the Police and Constabulary. In addition to the complications effected by poor relations between Police and Constabulary, the matter of dissident elements within the Constabulary was reaching a proportion of its own. These elements contributed greatly to the police-Constabulary trouble and even today, Communists miss no opportunity to capitalize on the old hard feelings which existed between the two organizations. The Constabulary immediately launched a campaign to rid the ranks of undesirables. This campaign has been continuous and is still being pushed vigorously. In May, Lt Col Barros was relieved as Advisor, Korean Constabulary and Captain Hausman was appointed Acting Advisor, Korean Constabulary. Period June 1947 through August 1947 In this period, emphasis was placed on Regimental schools for Officers and non-commissioned Officers, and training to include small unit tactics. The Constabulary was armed with Japanese rifles; clothing and equipment was not standard and quite limited. 21 July 1947, Captain Hausman assigned as Advisor, Korean Constabulary. By the end of July, the Constabulary strength had reached 15,000. Due to a limited budget, and the desire to abide by a closely-figured National expenditure, the Military Governor of Korea ordered recruitment stopped. Period September 1947 through February 1948 This six month period brought about the most important events in the history of the Constabulary. The Constabulary was officially looked upon as the Military Organization of South Korea. Recommendations to organize and equip with American arms and equipment, a Constabulary of 50,000 were submitted and approved. In alignment with this decision, approximately 90 US Army officers were authorized as Advisors to the Korean Constabulary. It was further agreed that a Brigadier General should be assigned to the Department of Internal Security to head the Advisory Group. Period March 1948 Through May 1948 By March, the Constabulary strength had increased to 20,000. For the first time, technical services such as Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Engineer and Medical were activated, and within the Constabulary a survey for qualified officers and men for these services was made. The Constabulary Officers Corps had expanded to a strength of approximately 1,200. Organization had made notable gains including the activation of three (3) Brigade Headquarters. 20 May 1948, Brigadier General W. L. Roberts took over the position of Director, Department of Internal Security relieving Colonel Terrill E. Price, who returned to the Zone of Interior. Period June 1948 Through 1948 The Department of Internal Security had retained direct control of all supply and finance functions and the technical services of the Korean Constabulary. General Robert's first major decision was to place the above functions and technical services directly under the Chief of Constabulary and in general, for the betterment of organization and training, to deemphasize the Department of Internal Security and place added emphasis on the Korean Constabulary. During this period, the Constabulary strength reached 35,000. By August, the reorganization had been accomplished and was working with a minimum amount of confusion. Numerous provisional schools were established for the purpose of training officers and men in the use of their new US arms and equipment. Training was given number one priority and standard training schedules and directives were drawn up and issued by Headquarters Korean Constabulary. A series of administrative and training inspections were conducted by General Roberts and Staff Advisors of the Korean Constabulary. These inspections brought out many deficiencies in the field and went far toward better organization, training and efficiency. Period September 1948 Through November 1948 The authorized strength of 50,000 was obtained. The technical services made commendable advancement. It was during this period that the Constabulary suffered its most serious setback. On the night of 19 October, a communist inspired rebellion broke out in the 14th Regiment stationed at Yosu, Cholla Namdo. By the use of cleverly devised propaganda, the communists were able to get almost full cooperation from the enlisted men and several officers of the 14th Regiment. The battles which followed were fierce and bloody. Approximately 1,000 police and civilians were killed. This rebellion proved to be the supreme test for the loyal Constabulary troops. Under command of General Song Ho Sueng, the loyal troops moved into the zone of action and within nine days the major portion of operations was over. Small groups of the rebels escaped capture and fled to the several mountainous areas of South Korea. These groups are being hunted daily by units of the loyal troops and when they are located, they are either killed or captured. The Yosu rebellion while a dark smear on the otherwise good reputation of the Korean Constabulary has been a great source of training for the field units, the staff and commanders of higher headquarters. It also was a good test for the system followed by the American Advisory Group for it showed that, although difficult, the Advisor can properly advise his counter-part even in battle. Period December 1948 Through January 1949 1 December the Korean National Security Act redesignated the Department of Internal Security, "Department of National Defense". This same Act re-designated the Korean Constabulary, "Korean Army", and authorized the army to organize the various branches of service as required. As of January, the Korean Army strength was 2730 officers and 61,858 enlisted men making a total of 64,588 officers and enlisted men. JAMES H. HAUSMAN Captain, Infantry Advisor, Korean Army 첨부 2. 인사참모부 Annex 2. G-1 The G-1 Section of the Korean Army is patterned after the organization of the Personnel Section of the American Army General Staff. It consists of 6 Officers and 18 enlisted men as follows: Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, an Executive Officer and an Officer in Charge of the Administrative Section, Personnel Management Section, Law and Order Section and Personnel Service Section. The Personnel Management Section is sub-divided into Military Personnel Sub-section, Replacement Sub-section (non-operational), and Civilian Employees Sub-section. The Replacement Sub-section will be operational only when the country mobilizes for war. The Korean Army consists of 2,730 Officers as follows: 3 Major Generals, 7 Brigadier Generals, 17 Colonels, 82 Lieutenant Colonels, 67 Majors, 323 Captains, 864 1st Lieutenants and 1373 2nd Lieutenants. There are 61,858 enlisted men in the Korean Army, making a total of 64,588 Officers and enlisted men. The Korean Military Academy has 1660 Cadets as follows: Officer Training School class #8, 408 Civilian Cadets and 276 Enlisted Men. Class #9 has 466 Civilian Cadets. In addition there are 5 classes of Special Cadets as follows: One class of 183 Cadets who were former leaders in the various Young Men Military Societies. 239 physical training instructors from the Middle Schools who, when graduated, will give basic military instructions to students in the Middle Schools. 21 doctors are undergoing an indoctrination course and will receive commission in the Medical Corps. 12 Electrical Engineers receiving an indoctrination course will be commissioned in the Signal Corps. 55 Engineers receiving an indoctrination course will be commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. Battle casualties from 1 October 1948 to 25 January 1949 are as follows: Killed in Action, 48 Officers, 257 enlisted men. Wounded, 29 Officers, 359 enlisted men. Missing, 1 Officer, 22 enlisted men. 10 Officers, 1482 enlisted men have deserted. 98 Officers and 1050 enlisted men have been confined. 0.75% enlisted men are Absent Without Official Leave and 0.3% Officers are Absent Without Official Leave. 1.8% enlisted men and 3.0% Officers are in confinement. 0.75% enlisted men and 1.0% Officers are on leave. There are 1200 cases of venereal disease in the Korean Army. 80 Officers and 706 enlisted men have gonorrhea. 50 Officers and 464 enlisted men have syphilis. F. W. McGINN Lt Col FA Advisor, G-1 첨부 3. 정보참모부 Annex 3, G-2 Cheju Do The recent incidents on this island are a continuance of disturbances which were implemented in April 1948. Cheju Do, long a base for smuggling, offered an ideal location for communists to begin active operations against the Government of South Korea. The guerrilla forces could easily be reinforced from the mainland or from North Korea, by fishing vessels. Initial successes in operations against police increased the supply of weapons. Vigorous campaigning by the 9th Regiment, Korean Constabulary, succeeded in restricting the operations of the guerrillas to hit-and-run foraging raids on inland villages. These raids were rendered ineffective by evacuating inhabitants of inland villages to the coastal areas. Rigorous patrolling further interdicted the guerrilla operations. Many innocent civilians have died on the island. The majority were killed in attacks by guerrillas, some undoubtedly by Korean Army. The number of guerrillas equipped with firearms does not exceed one hundred fifty. These armed men form the nucleus of attack groups primarily armed with knives, clubs and spears. The acceleration in tempo of activities has, as in all of South Korea, had but one purpose - to discredit the recognized Government of Korea. Activities of Communist Guerrillas during period 5 January 1949 to 5 February 1949 follow; major incidents only are reflected. Recapitulation of Casualties: KILLED WOUNDED CAPTURED WEAPONS LOST HOUSES DESTROYED Friendly Forces 17 43 1 12 rifles 535 Civilians 79 44 0 0 0 Guerrillas 304 1 77 0 0 NOTE: The negative report of firearms captured from guerrillas is misleading. The mass of the attack group is armed with swords, spears, knives, etc. Large numbers of these weapons have been captured from the guerrillas. Rifles, however, are more valuable to the guerrilla leaders than men. They willingly sacrifice their followers to obtain or retain firearms. JOHN P. REED Cant Cav Advisor, G-2 첨부 4. 작전참모부 Annex 4. G-3 1. Cheju Do Island a. Location - Approximately 70 miles southwest of the coast of Korea. b. Population - 300,000. c. Description and characteristics: (1) Size - 125 miles around perimeter, 60 miles long E/W, 30 miles wide N/S. (2) Terrain - In center of island is Hala-San mountain, height 5,600 feet. (3) Airstrips (a) Airstrip #1 at Musol-Po, western part of island. (b) Airstrip #2 at Cheju City used by Americans. d. Historical Background; (1) Penal Colony - Island at one time was used as a penal colony for people from mainland. This situation is partly responsible for bitter feeling between people on mainland and Cheju Do inhabitants. (2) Japanese Influence: (a) During the war the Japanese had approximately 250,000 troops on island. Two Horse Cavalry Divisions, Naval and Army Air Force units. (b) Air Strip #1 at Musol-po used as base to bomb Shanghai early part of war. e. American Troops: (1) 59th MG Company was located on island until September 1948. (2) One platoon from American 6th Division was stationed Cheju Airstrip until 1 January 1949. f. Political Background and Operations: (1) Cheju Islanders and Japanese got along very well. (2) South Korean Labor Party - Very strong up until elections in May. Basically follow Communistic Doctrine. (3) October 1948, trouble got out of hand. Communists took to hills and caves. Organized groups in all counties of island. 2. Operations on Cheju Do. a. Enemy Situation: (1) Communist Groups Headquarters located under cover. Control all weapons of communists in Group Headquarters. (2) Communists (Raiders) call on Communists from one village to raid another village. (3) Follow Communists Doctrine, Disorganize people, get them to fight one another. b. In May of 1948 the Korean Army had one under strength battalion located on Cheju. The natives of Cheju under Communist leadership became extremely active to the extent that local police and the small Army unit could no longer cope with the situation. Major General Dean, American Military Governor of Korea, together with General Song Ho Sueng, then Commanding General of the Korean Army, made a personal investigation of the situation. Reached a decision to send one regiment to Cheju. The 11th Regiment was ordered to occupy Cheju and restore law and order with a minimum amount of force. This met with partial success but it became obvious that the Rebel leaders were changing their tactics and were forcing the natives of Cheju to support and cooperate with them in their efforts against the Army and Police. In the meantime, the 11th Regiment, command ed by Colonel Bak - a young, aggressive and extremely able officer, who took positive action to correct a deteriorating situation and the prestige of his Government. The enemy realized this and immediately infiltrated the ranks with communists who were given a high priority to murder Colonel Bak, which they accomplished. Colonel Bak's assassins were arrested, tried and sentenced at Seoul. Colonel Bak was replaced by an able officer who succeeded in bringing the Cheju situation under control. 3. Friendly Situation. a. Troops - 9th Regiment, Korean Army, stationed on island from July 1948 until December 1948. Relieved by 2d Regiment, Korean Army. 9th Regiment: (1) Disposition - Troops broken down to Company and Platoon strength and placed on outpost duty at strategic points around island. (2) Plan - Since whereabouts and nature of communist forces was unknown, 9th Regiment planned as follows: Clear island area of all natives and stop fishing boats from leaving harbors. From these fishing boats Rebels had been receiving supplies from North Korea and Osaka. (3) Results: At first results were poor, with only a few rounds of ammunition being taken and a few enemy killed. However, with the resupply of Rebel ammunition being cut off, the Rebels were forced to regroup their forces into two large forces in order to carry on operations. One force occupied the Eastern half of the island, one the Western half. In later operations the Peoples Army leader was killed. When the 9th Regiment left the Rebels were located in one central location and were a strong, roving band. (4) Observation of American Advisor - The natives of the island had changed from leftist into rightist and were supporting the Korean Army. Results of operations 1 April 1948 to 15 January 1949 Killed............................. 2441 Wounded........................... 406 Missing........................... 466 Captured and Confined............. 2516 Sentenced......................... 150 Grand Total....................... 5979 9th Regiment Killed in Action.................. 30 Wounded in Action................. 75 Lost 1 Truck, 1 SCR 300 Radio and 35 weapons. (5) The 9th Regiment was replaced by the 2d Regiment Korean Army. During the withdrawal of the 9th and replacement by the 2d, the Communist Forces again began operating. b. Present and Future Plans: (1) The 2d Regiment is now operating on Cheju Do with the mission of containing and destroying the Communist Elements. W. F. WEST Major, Inf Advisor G-3, KA