제5여단소속 미군 고문관의 지위 및 능력

AMERICAN ADVISOR CAPACITY IN THE 5th BRIGADE Capt J B W Treadwell, Chief, PMAG 9 October 1948 WESWiWLR;ee Advisor, 5th Brigade Gen Roberts 1. The highlighting of the recent Cheju Do operations has brought certain deficiencies to light, which - it is felt - should have previously been corrected by the American Advisors. Fast operations on Cheju Do generally have been under the control of DIS Headquarters. Present operations, however, are in the opinion of a Corps Commander - entirely a Korean responsibility. It is felt that the entire mounting and support of present and projected operations should be handled by Koreans through proper command channels, with a minimum of American interference. It is therefore devolves upon the 5th Brigade to supply the entire tactical and logistical support of current operations of the 9th Regiment. As pointed out above, it is felt that the 5th Brigade has failed to provide proper support, and that immediate corrective action is indicated on the part of the American Advisors through Korean channels. 2. Inspections of the units on Cheju Do have indicated marked shortages of essential equipment of all categories. For example, shoes, clothing, maps, rifles, ammunition and rations were all short; further, [illegible] inspections by either the senior American Brigade Advisor [illegible] Staff Officers have been made for some period of [illegible] lack of interest and push is inexcusable on the Korean side, and equally as inexcusable on the part of the American Advisors. 3. The same conditions apparently obtain at Yosu, where there were marked shortages of shoes and other equipment. Inspections indicated that the week levels at Brigade were adequate to supply needy units but they were not being utilized for that purpose. Apparently the Brigade [illegible] is a hoarder, or possibly even a grafter, and he should be investigated and corrected. 4. Inspections also indicate that training directives are not getting down promptly to units for whom intended. This also needs immediate corrective action and indicates a lack of push on the part of the American Advisors. We are, in theory, in the midst of the unit training phase for the Korean Constabulary, and it is hard to understand why training directives are not in the hands of the units to be trained. 5. As has been frequently pointed out, American Advisors are very much on their own, and they stand or fall by their individual drive, initiative and leadership. Infrequent inspections provide our only check on the work of American Advisors. It is apparent that the entire 5th Brigade has not had the type of advice necessary to make the Korean Constabulary a growing concern. 6. You will take immediate corrective actions on all the points enumerated above and make written reply as to the measures taken, plus any pertinent comments relative to conditions within the 5th Brigade. W. L. ROBERTS Brig Gen USA Chief, PMAG