제주도청 방화

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF TABLE OF CONTENTS Selected items for the Information of Commanders NO. and Staffs of the Far East Command DATE 2315 10 January 1949 # INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS (4) KOREA South Korean teachers arrested for teaching communism, advocating overthrow of Government. Guerrillas burn capitol in Cheju; records destroyed. North Korean agent captured. Many North Korean spies awaiting assignments to enter South Korea. KOREA Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation, Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous Selected items for the Information of Commanders and Staffs of the Far East Command No. 2315 POLITICAL REPORT --- p291 --- 1. Communist Activity: (a) Teachers Arrested: Nine teachers of the Chinhae boys' high school were arrested on 14 Dec for organizing a cell of the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) within the school. The teachers taught communism in class and held secret meetings of the pupils at which plans were made to take an active part in the overthrow of the Government of the Korean Republic. These teachers are in confinement awaiting trial. (C-3) The assistant principal and three teachers of the Yungsan primary school, SKLP members, were arrested on 20 Dec after admitting that they advocated the overthrow of the government by force and violence. Leftist teachers of Pusan primary schools have been instructing pupils to write compositions lauding the North Korean Government. These papers are sent to North Korean schools to be used as propaganda. (a) (b) Guerrilla Raid: Guerrilla troops burned the provincial capital in Cheju, Cheju Island, on 3 Jan. Government records were destroyed by the fire. (b) Comment: Guerrilla forces have been active on the island for several months, but reports indicate that they are being brought under control gradually by loyal force. (c) Agent Objectives: A pattern of action to be followed by North Korean agents south of the 38th Parallel has been outlined by a confessed saboteur and intelligence operator who was captured by South Korean police in Chongdan on 6 Dec. He admitted that he had been instructed to (1) join guerrillas in Northern Kangwon Province and co-operate with the SKLP, (2) gather data on road, trail, and terrain conditions between Seoul and Chunchon, (3) bribe police officials and members of youth groups, (4) destroy telephone and telegraph lines, and (5) rejoin his organization in Chorwon, North Korea, upon the outbreak of large-scale guerrilla warfare in Kangwon Province. (c) (d) North Korean Agent: Recent interrogation of a former member of the North Korean Constabulary revealed that 67 espionage agents of the North Korean Government are at Haeju, North Korea, awaiting assignments to enter South Korea. Most of the agents are to be assigned targets in North and South Cholla Provinces. Each agent will be allotted 5,000 yen for traveling expenses and given the name and address of a member of the SKLP in or near his assigned area in order that he may receive food, clothing, and shelter while on his mission. Each agent will be allotted approximately one week to complete his assigned task. Before the agent crosses the 38th Parallel into South Korea, his identification, citizenship, and rice ration cards will be taken away and held until his return. If the mission takes longer then one week, the agent will contact the local headquarters of the SKLP and obtain a South Korean rice ration card and citizenship papers. Approximately 25 per cent of the espionage agents are students who attained a high academic rating in North Korean schools or who are members of the Democratic Youth Alliance or the North Korean Labor Party. The other 75 per cent are merchants or peddlers who wish to enter South Korea for the purpose of selling or buying goods. Very little positive intelligence training has been given to this latter group. All agents will be directed to determine (1) the strength, disposition and approximate number of U.S. troops, type of weapons used, and location of warehouses in South Korea; (2) the strength and disposition of the South Korean police and Constabulary, type of weapons used, and the feeling that exists between the two forces; (3) the names, addresses, and party affiliations of members of the National Assembly; and (4) popular opinion toward communism and the recent riots in South Korea. (F-6) (d)