계엄령‧국가비상사태 선포 소문

SECRET GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF TABLE-OF CONTENTS Selected items for the Information of Commanders NO. and Staffs of the Far East Command DATE 2491 5 July 1949 **KOREA** **Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation, Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous** Selected items for the Information of Commanders and Staffs of the Far East Command No. 2491 MILITARY SITUATION 1. Recent Developments: a. Army Strength Increases: The Korean Republic increased the over-all strength of its armed forces during the period 18-24 Jun, through a substantial gain in the Army. The Army now numbers 76,340, and the Navy 5,419. These figures represent an increase of 1,101 in the Army, and a decrease of 12 in the Navy, since 18 Jun (Intell. Summary 2482). The strength of the National Police remained at 50,484, and that of the Army Reserve Corps at 28,585. (a) b. Rebels Change Tactics: Seven attacks by rebels on police stations, and three minor Korean Army operations against rebels were reported during the period 18-24 Jun. An important change in rebel tactics occurred in South Kyongsang Province. In two of the incidents an estimated 100-110 rebels reportedly burned 303 houses. The National Police is considering eliminating isolated police boxes in some mountainous regions. The National Police said the plan is being considered because of the successful rebel tactics of attacking isolated police boxes and subsequently ambusing truck loads of police reinforcements. The rebels have exploited fully their latest tactics, causing many unnecessary casualties among the police. (a) Source Comment: The rebels' tactics of burning houses appears to be an attempt to instill fear of rebel action in the minds of farmers, thus forcibly stimulating the farmers' desire to side with the rebels. The attacks on the police boxes appear to be well organized and skillfully carried out. (a) Comment: Intimidation of the people is a typical Communist method of gaining "supporters." Rebels met with considerable success using their fire technique on Cheju Island, where more than one-third of the homes were razed (Intell. Summary 2402). Whether the Government can suppress the rebels will be determined to a large degree by the methods the armed forces employ to regain the confidence of the farmers and to punish the Communist "supporters." c. Martial Law: Consistent and enlarged rumors, circuiting in Seoul since 18 Jun, state that President RHEE Syngman will declare martial law or a state of limited emergency ostensibly as a precaution against possible unfavorable reaction following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. SHIN Sung Mo, Minister of National Defense, and leaders of the Korean Army and Navy reportedly --- p319 --- desire a declaration of full martial law in order to fully implement a purge of leftists and moderates who advocate a coalition government with the "Democratic People's Republic" of North Korea. KIM Hyo Suk, Minister of Home Affairs, and the National Police reportedly oppose a declaration of martial law, since the police would lose their present power. SHIN reportedly has agreed to such action providing President RHEE will, by special executive order, give the National Police equal powers with the Army and Navy. The Chief Executive reportedly is considering whether to declare martial law or whether to give the police equal power with the Army. Reports state that the original date for the declaration of martial law was set to coincide with the departure of the last elements of U.S. troops. However, the implementation date has been delayed because of disagreement in the President's Cabinet. (B-3) (a,b) Source Comment: The above action by President RHEE is not considered probable. If such action occurs, it probably will create serious hostility toward the executive branch of the Government. (a) Comment: All U.S. troops in South Korea, except personnel of the Korean Military Advisory Group, were withdrawn by 1200 hours, 29 Jun.