1948년 4월 이후의 내란과 관련한 이범석의 보고

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Dispatch No. 14 American Mission in Korea CONFIDENTIAL Seoul, January 10, 1949 Subject: Report of Minister of National Defense, Lee Bum Suk, on Internal Insurrections after April 1948 NO. [illegible] KOREAN AFFAIRS [illegible] The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Sir: I have the honor to submit a translation of a report entitled "Internal Insurrections after April, 1948," which was given to the National Assembly in a speech made by LEE Bum Suk, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, on December 7, 1948. The report was requested during a period when the National Assembly became increasingly concerned over instances of direct, [illegible] and possibly illegal interference by the Army and the [illegible] with the lives of the people. The particular target of the Assembly was the Home Minister, Mr. YUH Chi Yung. But the con-[illegible] imposition of martial law in North and South Cholla lang [illegible] the qualling of the Yesu-Sunchon revolt resulted in numerous [illegible] acts by Police and Army which were regarded by local [illegible] members as responsible for much local hardship. The threat to civil liberties, the hardships observed among constituents, and [illegible] --- p249 --- [illegible] that the local populace tended to blame the Assembly for their sufferings under martial law, caused the Assembly to feel that it was losing face and that the successful progress of the important Cheju Purchasing and National Traitors Acts was being endangered. Further Assembly concern was related to national defense in general and the problem of Youth Group amalgamation in particular (see Mission Despatch No. 140, dated December 30, 1948) which the Assembly had initially recommended and the progress of which it continued to watch with interest as a future bulwark of Korean defense. The report describes the protracted struggle on Cheju Island, the "the Mai incident" (i.e., the Yosu-Sunchon rebellion of October), the Cheju incident of November 2nd and the more recent fighting in the vicinity of Mt. Odai in central Kangwon province. The history of each incident is given in some detail, the causes of the incident and analysis of future plans and enemy potential is given more briefly. The security and doubtfulness of the details of much that happens in Korea, taken in conjunction with the extensive intelligence gathering resources of the United States Army in Korea, make the amount due the accuracy of this report possible and desirable. In general, the report seems to be an honest attempt to present what the Korean Ministry of National Defense considered to be the facts of these uprisings. Its principal weakness seems to lie in the analysis of the causes of these incidents and in the exaggeration of Korean Army successes. That part of the report dealing with the Cheju Island incident elicited particular comment from G-2, United States Army Forces in Korea. G-2, for example, feels that "Reasons" behind the Cheju Island incident are too generalized to be a useful guide to action, and that they are also, not unexpectedly, one-sided. The graft and inefficiency of Korean Government officials played a part in causing friction between officials and islanders; parochial-mindedness among the latter was only part of the explanation. Lack of control and coordination among personnel who were responsible for keeping peace on the island resulted in popular dissatisfaction and failure to curb disturbances. Extreme acts of violence by Police resulted in further hostility and panic. All this created fertile soil for Communist organization and propaganda, whether directly from the north or through the agency of the South Korean Labor Party. Moreover, G-2 considers it doubtful whether there are 100,000 Cheju Island laborers in Japan. However, it considers that some aid from the Korean League in Japan to the rebels is not improbable. Statements that "the number of armed rioters has decreased to 50 or 60," and that there are "premises of an early subjection," are also considered improbable. By G-2 which believes the number of rioters was probably greater, that me estimates relative to Cheju Island are reliable due to the extremely fluid way in which forces can be dismissed, recalled, hidden or reissued weapons, and that early pacification of the island is doubtful. In Table I, First Operations of the Army, reported as being from April to middle June, actually took place from April 3rd --- p250 --- to July 15th, G-2 reports a total of 135 Communists killed. The statements on the South Cholla, Taegu and Kangwon incidents are considered by G-2 as more reliable. G-2 figures show that with respect to Table III, 3a, 600 insurgents were shot instead of 826, and 2,581 captured instead of 2,856. Likewise, in Table IV, 1b, 70 insurgents instead of 30 fled to Kumchon, and in Table IV, 3, 90 human rebels and 307 others, rather than 10 armed rebels and 50 others, are shown. In Table II, the totals of "Own Casualties" are indicated as 55 killed, 164 wounded, and of enemy casualties as 600 [illegible] and 2,581 captured instead of 141 killed, 153 wounded and 821 killed, 2660 captured for own and enemy troops, respectively. There may, of course, be other figures which are similarly inaccurate but in regard to which G-2 has no better information. This distributed report was accompanied by a speech of the Prime Minister which was far shorter than the report. This speech, (see Enclosure No. 2) briefly summarized the report and touched on the needs, the progress and the hopes of the National Army. The report and the speech were generally well received by the National Assembly. Several members asked, however, why, in view of [illegible] marsh of events, martial law continued in North and [illegible] Cholla and on Cheju Island. The Prime Minister replied that [illegible] law was necessary for the continued subjugation of insurgents [illegible] it would be lifted as soon as possible. This answer did [illegible] entirely satisfy certain National Assemblymen, who continued to [illegible] that the civil rights of the population in those areas were being unnecessarily compromised. Martial law was lifted on Cheju Island on January 1, 1949, by the State Council, but it continues in North and South Cholla at the present time. Respectfully yours, For the Special Representative: Everett F. Drumright Counselor of Mission <첨부문서> 제1호: 1948년 4월 이후 국내 소란사건 보고 REPORT ON THE INTERNAL INSURRECTIONS AFTER APRIL, 1948, MADE BY MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, LEE BUM SUK PART I. Introduction [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] it to you a report of the insurrections which have risen in various places in South Korea since April 3, 1948, in [illegible] order [illegible] --- p251 --- Cheju Island Incident; Ho Nam Incident; Taegu Incident; King Kong Province Incident. **PART II** - The Cheju Island Incident 1. History a. Reasons (a) Because it is an isolated island, the propaganda and plots of the so-called Peoples' Republic which sprang up right after liberation are still in existence. (b) More than 100,000 Cheju laborers in Japan are persistent followers of Communistic [illegible] (c) [illegible] of the islanders toward the administrative organizations, the [illegible] islanders are extremely [illegible] and they hate policemen from other provinces. (d) Plots and underground activities of the South and North Korea Labor Parties. D. Developments Since the outbreak of the insurrection on Cheju Island on the 3rd of April, armed insurgents have, under the control of the Leftists, perpetrated all kinds of cruelties all over the island, [illegible] as murder, incendiarism, assaults on Government and public organizations, and robbery. The National Army appealed to the [illegible] the conscience of the rioters and patriots [illegible] the [illegible] times to reflect on the [illegible] not only did they pay no attention [illegible] but on the contrary, they increased their atrocities. Considering the spreading influence of the serious conditions all over South Korea, we had to take up arms to reprimand them on the 11th of the same month. They are using the natural advantages of Halla Mountain for their guerrilla tactics and avoid head-on collisions. Most of the islanders are relatives of the insurgents and are cooperating with them, but due to appropriate measures taken by the able Commander of the Ninth Regiment we have promises of an early subjugation. --- p252 --- 2. Disposition a. Plan We will appeal to their patriotic feelings first but in case they refuse to listen we are determined to exterminate them. b. Disposition of troops The Ninth Regiment of the National Army in Cheju Island has been suppressing the insurgents for the past nine months, since the middle of April, with 116 officers and 2,968 soldiers. The Eleventh Regiment was organized there, but a part of this was replaced by others sometime in July of this year. The main force of the Regiment was transferred to Suwon, Kyonggi Province. The total result of the battles is listed in Table 1, attached. On the other hand, the Navy assigned ships for the transportation of soldiers and, since the 18th of October they have blockaded all sides of the island with seven ships and 203 sailors; they are contributing a great deal to the operations of the Army. 3. The Future a. The Movement of the Enemy What with the infliction of a crushing defeat on the enemy by the National Army and what with the lack of food, weapons, munitions, and collaboraters on their part, the number of the armed rioters has decreased to 50 or 60, but it is a greatly regrettable matter that most of the islanders are spiritual supporters of the insurgents. b. The forces of the Ninth Regiment have occupied all important points on the island and have removed all the people in the mountain villages to the seaside town for the enforcement of the "Bokap" (Joint responsibility of community) system. They have cut all the trees and bushes along [illegible] sides of the roads on the island for the prevention of sudden attacks by the insurgents and have also cut off all the enemy's supply routes. The army is proceeding [illegible] solutely to rehabilitate Cheju island by taking --- p253 --- decisive measures against the collaborators of the rioters. c. The Future There was a tendency for the insurgents, whose fate was being by a single hair, to being satisfying fires as their last resort, but because of the continuance of persistent military operations and martial law proclaimed on the 16th of November, conditions have rapidly begun to take a turn for the better. The Army and the Police have been united as one body. We deem it highly necessary to lead the islanders morally. Table 3 - Summary result of the Cheju Incident | No. of | No. of com- | No. of Enemy | Period of | Casualties | | |battles|batants|troops|Operations|Own|Enemy| |||Max|Present|||| | 12 | 3,015 | 1,00. | | From April | 1 killed | 50 dead | | | (Both | armed | | to middle | 3 wounded | 7,015cap- | | 1. | garrison | and | | of June | | tives | | R | and com- | 2,00. | | | | | | 3 | batants) | others | | | | Weapons | | | | | | | | Many | | 60 | 2,112 | 30 | | From middle | 5 killed | 102 dead | | 8 B | (Garrison | | | of June to | wounded | 3,704 cap- | | C | and com- | | | present | | tives | | 0 | batants) | | | | | | | | 7 ships | | | 7 months | | 5 ships | | | and | | | from April | | captured | | | 203 | | | to Decem- | | | | | sailors | | | ber | | | PART III. The Ho Nam Incident 1. History a. Reasons (a) The cells of the South Korea Labor Party had been organized in Army units; (b) When they were ordered to Cheju Island, the Leftist cells in the Fourteenth Regiment received directives from the Party; (c) The Local Leftist Cells, Leftist Yougg People's Organizations and the Cells in schools had been joined to the Cells in the Regiment; (d) The arrest of Major Oh Dong Ki exposed the joint-plot of the extreme Rightists and Leftists. --- p254 --- b. Developments The Fourteenth Regiment, in Yosu, which had been ordered to leave the subjugation of the Cheju rioters on the 19th of October received directives from the South Korea Labor Party, and three officers and about 40 privates rose in revolt despite the desperate attempts of their Battalion Commander to prevent them. They captured Yosu City completely at 8:00 A.M. on the 20th and organized the People's Army, composed of the local Leftist organizations and students. enemy and are exterminating them. The details are found in Table IV attached. The Navy blockaded the coast-line south of the 180 para [illegible] with the ships of the Second Special [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] great rains. 3. The Future a. The Movement of the Enemy At it [illegible] Communist [illegible] the so-called First Battalion, [illegible] leader almost annihilated and there is a run- the about the same number of bandits are pointing [illegible]. b. The Future We are prepared in every way to meet them and 200 of the so-called Second Battalion will inevitably meet the same fate as their predecessors. The National Army, in cooperation with the police and people is taking an active part in the battles with the Communist bandits. If the North Korea Puppet Government should continue such atrocious activities by guerrilla warfare, we want to add a remark that we will surely work retribution on them with more than they bargain for. PART VI. Conclusions All the incidents that have occurred in South Korea are due to the vicious destructive moves of the Communists fanned by the plots and propaganda of the North Korea Puppet Government and the lack of unified ideology and practical ability on the part of the Government of the Republic of Korea. A part of the National Army was under their evil influence, and this is certainly an indelible stain on the history of the Army, but we think this is a good chance to purge all the rebellious elements and to establish a strong National Army with a unified ideology. We have already achieved rather good success. We will soon establish a National Army that can justify the Nation's --- p255 --- trust and stop all the destructive activities, however strong their perpetrators may be. We are making preparations against all cases of emergencies to the satisfaction of the people. We hope that the high and low of this country will unite together with an iron will and strong cooperative spirit in order to tide over the extremely difficult situation we are facing at present and to ensure the happiness of our posterity of thousands of generations to come. Table 2 - Summary of Results of the [illegible] No. [illegible] | [illegible] of | Total num- | Number of | [illegible] | | [illegible] | | [illegible] and | ber of | [illegible] T[illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | | [illegible] | partici- | | | | | | | pants from | Max | Present | | | | | units in | | | | | | | any one | | | | | | | area | | | | | | [illegible](Sokoo) | 2,000 | 70 | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | | | | | | | [illegible] captured | | | | | | | [illegible] and | | | | | | | [illegible] | | [illegible]phon | 1,000 | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | | [illegible] | | | | | | | [illegible] | | 200 | [illegible] | | | | [illegible] | 170 | 500 | [illegible] | [illegible] | Many trophies | | [illegible] | 617 | 200 | From Oct. | | 9 dead | | [illegible] | | | 24-27 | killed | 5 captured | | | | | | | Many tro- | | | | | | | phies | | | 600 | 300 | From Oct. | 2 killed | 6 dead | | | | | 22-24 | 2 wounded | 12 captured | | | | | | | Many tro- | | | | | | | phies | | | 700 | 1,000 | From Oct. | 15 killed | 263 dead | | | | | 25-28 | 91 wounded | 1,183 cap- | | | | | | | tured | | | | | | | Many troph | | | | | | | ies | | | 300 | 300 | From Oct. | None | Many | | | | | 28 to | | trophies | | | | | Nov. 1 | | | | [illegible] | 400 | 500 | From Oct. | None | Many | | | | | 26-25 | | trophies | | [illegible] | 600 | 150 | From Nov. | [illegible] killed | 12 dead | | | | | 1-4 | 4 wounded | 40 captur- | | | | | | | ed | | | | | | | Many tro- | | | | | | | phies | | | *3,000 | 900 | From Nov. | 1 wounded | 262 dead | | | | | 5-30 | 1 missing | 160 cap- | | | | | | | tured | | | | | | | Many tro- | | | | | | | phies | | | *2,615 | 900 | From Nov | 27 killed | 228 dead | | | | | 15-25 | 72 wounded | 618 captured | | | | | | 3 missing | Many trophies | | | 110 | 3,700 | 200 | About | 141 killed | 821 dead | | | officers | | | 2 months | 183 wounded | 2,680 cap- | | | 4,732 | | | longer | 16 missing | tured | | | soldiers | | | for full | | Many tro- | | | | | | clean-up | | phies | | | 2,914 | 1,568 | 7 | About 2 | 1 killed | 5 dead | | | | | | months | 6 wounded | 176 captured | | | | | | longer | | | | | | | | for full | | | | | | | | clean-up | | [illegible] |