제주도 상황 보고

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA American Emb[illegible]s[illegible], [illegible] Korea, No. 11 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] CONFIDENTIAL Subject: Transmitting Report of [illegible]uty[illegible] the [illegible]land. [illegible] KOREAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE [illegible] The Secretary of State, [illegible] Sir: A[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] transmittal [illegible] of a report [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on Cheju Island on developments there between [illegible] over [illegible] [illegible] December 30, 1948. As the Department is aware, Cheju Island has for some time been the focal point of disturbances in South Korea. The terrain is ideal for guerrilla activities, and the provincialism of its population and their antipathy for mainlanders have been exploited by Communist elements to keep the island in a continuous state of unrest. However, in the past month or two, the suppression of subversive elements on the island has made gratifying progress. This is due in part to an aggressive pacification campaign waged by the 9th Constabulary Regiment, and in part to a growing proclivity on the part of the civilian population to cooperate with the loyal security forces in suppressing disturbances. This latter development, the importance of which cannot be overemphasized, is apparently the product of several factors: 1) a growing hatred among the islanders stemming from the loss of life and wanton destruction inflicted; **2**) a growing effort on the part of the security forces to cultivate the good will and cooperation of the islanders; and 3) an increasing belief among the islanders that the Korean Government has the power and determination to suppress the raiders. In December 1948 the 9th Constabulary regiment was withdrawn from Cheju, being replaced by the 2nd Constabulary Regiment. It is still too early to be in a position to judge the capabilities of the 2nd Constabulary Regiment. Although the main power of the raiders appears to have been broken, there is little doubt that the 2nd Constabulary Regiment will be fully occupied in putting down remnant bands and in maintaining order in the remoter areas of the island. Respectfully yours, For the Special Representative: Everett F. Drumright Counselor of Mission Enclosure: (1) [illegible] Report, as stated. Original and hectograph to Department. <첨부문서> 48년 11~12월 제주도 정치 개관 7쪽 Enclosure No. 1 to [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] from [illegible] American [illegible] in [illegible], [illegible]. 971ST COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT USAFIK LIAISON OFFICER, CP JEJU APR 112 [illegible] P10001 November 1948 To: CG2USC December 1948 Areas: Cheju District, POLITICAL SURVEY made by No. 7 I TERRORISM AND DISTURBANCES WITH POLITICAL ASPECTS: Raider activity has decreased considerably during this period. This decrease is the entirely t... aggressive campaign waged by the Constabulary Regiment. Scattered resistance has been met in a few instances, but the battle plan of the Constabulary has been well executed. The mountainous terrain through the central sector of the island has been an asset to the raiders and a handicap to the Constabulary. As the raiders were driven from one sector they would drift back into the hills, reform, and strike anew on the opposite side of the island. To circumvent this, troops were placed in the hills; they have been very successful in stopping this reorganization. Since the mountainous country has been blocked, and the avenues of escape covered, it is assumed that the raiders have drifted into coastal villages in small groups or as individuals. The Constabulary's present plan, is to search all coastal villages looking for arms and ammunition. At the close of this period the number of active raiders is unknown; however the number of weapons of all kinds in the raiders' possession is estimated at thirty one (31). This is assumed to be a fairly accurate estimate gathered during the interrogation of captured raiders. The official report of known casualties is three thousand five hundred and forty nine (3,549); however, a thoroughly reliable unofficial source states that the figure should be over five thousand (5,000). II PROPAGANDA 14 1700 December 1948, the Police, with the approval of the Constabulary instituted a special curfew, one hour earlier than usual and much more rigidly enforced, to prevent the possibility of any unusual disturbance during the celebration of the United Nation's approval of the South Korean Republic. All persons who could not properly identify themselves were interrogated. Very few arrests were made. The ceremony, held in the village square of Cheju City, was orderly and well attended, with a holiday spirit prevailing. Leftist leaflets have not been distributed during this period. The Constabulary have distributed a few leaflets addressed for the most part, to the hill people, urging them to come out of the hills and move to the coastal villages. These leaflets also cite the success of the present Constabulary operations, illustrate the danger of remaining in the hills, and request infor- mation and cooperation in [illegible] further raider activity. III POLITICAL RUMORS AND PREPARED RUMORS AND REACTIONS Rumors have died down considerably with one notable exception, it being the one pertaining to the fact that, "North Korea is conducting the Cheju Do uprising, and only a matter of time remains before the downfall of the New Korean Republic is complete." IV POLITICAL MEETINGS OF SIGNIFICANCE The lack of Political meetings, and/or activities, rightist or leftist, has caused this office to initiate an active campaign to ascertain the present whereabouts of these various groups. V NEW POLITICAL PARTIES Negative VI FLUCTUATION IN STRENGTH OR ACTIVITY OF ANY PARTY As outlined in paragraph five (V), the lack of meetings and other activities would indicate that all parties have been disbanded. Since no official order has been published to this effect, efforts are being made to secure membership lists or accurate estimates of present active members. VII CHANGE IN POLICY OF ANY PARTY Unknown at present. This phase is included in the statements made in paragraphs five (V) and six (VI). VIII POLITICAL ARRESTS, RAIDS, AND SEARCHES OF SIGNIFICANCE During this period a Provost Court Marshal Board was established for the purpose of trying all leftist persons captured by the Constabulary and Police. To date over seven hundred (700) persons have been tried; of this total ninety six (96) have been sentenced to be executed and three hundred and thirty (330) ordered confined for various lengths of time. Confinement is to be served at the Mokpo Prison. Of the ninety six (96) sentenced to be executed, twenty three (23) were Constabulary men convicted for aiding and abetting the enemy. The court is still in session and they have approximately one hundred and seventy (170) persons to be tried. Martial law was decreed on 5 December 1948, making the Commanding Officer of the 9th Regiment Commander of the island. This law curtails the movement of all persons on the island and limits raider activities to the [illegible] country in the most part. Indications point to the removal of the law as soon as the 2nd Regiment takes full control of the [illegible]. D MISCELLANEOUS POLITICAL [illegible] It has been reported that in [illegible] the [illegible] of August 1948, approximately three hundred (300) leftists arrived on Cheju Do from the mainland. Some of this group were reportedly North Koreans. These 300 people formed [illegible] [illegible] of all raider activity. As near as can be ascertained at the present time, there are about thirty (30) of the original group still active. It is reported that the weapons still in the raiders' possession are carried by these 30 men, who are the active leaders. The balance of the original group have been killed or escaped from the island. W. J. KAVANAUGH OIC