폭도들을 은신처로 몰아

HQ USAFIK G-2 P/R #1097 e. CHEJU-DO Rebels Driven into Hiding Aggressive action by KA troops has driven CHEJU Island rebels into hiding and the last three weeks of March were the quietest the island has known since 1 March 1947. For a complete on-the-spot report on the CHEJU situation see Incl 3. <첨부문서> : 제주도 HQ USAFIK G-2 P/R #1097 INCL #1 Lo[illegible] CHEJU-DO CHEJU Island, historic Korean seat of unrest and for the past year a bloody battle ground of warring ideologies which has seen the slaying of 15,000 people and the razing of one-third its homes, gradually is returning to normalcy, and the last three weeks of March were the quietest days the island has known since 1 March 1947. To better understand the current situation on CHEJU-DO it is necessary to consider something of the history, people, geography and record of military operations against rebel forces which have preceeded the present lull. Geography Located some 60 miles off the southern tip of KOREA, CHEJU-DO is a volcanic island approximately 20 miles wide and 50 miles long. From a narrow coastal plain, the terrain gradient slopes upward toward HALLA Mountain, 6,000-foot peak which is located roughly in the center of the island. The mountainous interior of the island is wooded with scrub trees and undergrowth and is extremely rugged. CHEJU-DO is covered with stones of volcanic origin, and every small rice paddy is ringed with a stone fence, which adds to the difficulties of cross-insular travel and military operations. The only road on the island worthy of mention is a rough perimeter highway. The People Historically the people of the island are reported to have originated from three families, but, before Japanese occupation and during the some 600 odd years of the LEE Dynasty, CHEJU -DO was used as a dumping ground for political malcontents from the mainland. Generally the lower class people appear to be of a higher level of intelligence and to be better physical specimens than their mainland counterparts. They are inherently honest and independent and greatly resent interference, thievery and graft associated with mainland officials and migrants. Women do the bulk of manual labor with men devoting more of their time to supervisory functions, trades, hunting and fishing. History No pretense will be made in this report even to sketch lightly the history of the island except in so far as the history provides background for post liberation civil strife. The centuries-old practice of using CHEJU as a place of exile for minority political groups and governmental maladministration gradually built up in the island a separatist psychology. The consciousness of being a people apart was more than the geographical separation of 60 miles of water, and the feeling was aggravated by the policy of mainland governments to treat the island more in the nature of a possession than as an inclusive portion of KOREA. Occupying Japanese, although they governed CHEJU-DO as a political subdivision of CHOLLA-NAMDO Province, made no attempt to encourage a feeling of closer cohesion with the mainland. In fact, as a concession to the revolutionary spirit of the islanders, Japanese administrators took a more kindly attitude toward the people than in most of their areas of occupation. Consequently anti-Japanese sentiment on the island is less pronounced than in the remainder of KOREA. With the spread of the Japanese Empire and continued drain on [illegible] manpower, military necessity forced Japanese rulers to begin drafting island people for slave labor and compulsory service in their armed Forces. The act ended an extended period of relative stability, since, quick to resent compulsion, the people began to organize resistance movements, with communist opportunists lending the way. When liberation from the Japanese yoke came in the fall of 1945, a communist underground movement already was in existence, which grew in size and strength under the pressure of poor governmental administration and increased outside communist exploitation. In late 1946 as a concession to the people of CHEJU, the island was given provincial status. The present governor of the island, LIM Kwan Ho, a native, has held his position for the past 10 months. Communist-incited disturbances on the island were held to a relative low by occupying U.S. Forces until 1 March 1947 when police attacked a group of leftist SAM IL Day celebrants in CHEJU City and killed several people. Prompt reprisals against police were taken by offended islanders, and a year-long period of bloody violence was touched off. Disturbances were sporadic for several months, but by April 1948 the situation had become sufficiently serious that the then 1,200 policemen on the island were unable to maintain even a relative degree of stability. It was decided by the interim Korean Government to reinforce police with Army troops. Early Military Operations In April of 1948 the first Korean Army unit, a battalion, was sent to the island. The following month the initial battalion was used as nucleus of the 11th Regiment, and 2 other battalions were transferred into the unit from mainland regiments. Little actual good was accomplished by the 11th Regiment. Many of its members were either communists or leftist sympathizers. Some of the troops defected to the mountains to join the rebel forces, and Colonel PAK, regimental commander, was killed by his own men. In July 1948 the 11th was withdrawn and was replaced by the 9th Regiment, which promptly substituted an indiscriminate reign of terror for the do-nothing policies of the 11th Regiment. The 9th waged reasonably successful warfare against the rebels, but, simultaneously to stamp out all resistance, it adopted a program of mass slaughter among civilians in the hill villages avowedly on the premise that the people all were furnishing aid and comfort to guerrilla troops. During its period of occupation until December 1948 most of the casualties among islanders occurred. The plan on the surface appeared to be profitable, and during the last 2 months of 1948 there was a period of relatively little rebel activity on CHEJU, but actually the indiscriminate tactics of the organization developed new rebel converts. In December when the 9th was replaced by the 2nd Regiment a new wave of guerrilla terrorism was launched. The 2nd Regiment, commanded by Colonel HAM Byong Son, initially took up billets in coastal towns and villages, and its commander established a program of propagandizing intended to enlighten the island people and to woo rebels down from the hills. Lack of aggressive action against armed rebels in their mountain hide-outs made a farce of the program, and the encouraged guerrillas foraged far afield to strike coastal villages under the noses of protecting troops. The 2nd then became somewhat more aggressive, but its activities were largely confined to counter-measures against the people of coastal villages who were charged with aiding rebel forces in their activities and often were summarily executed in large numbers without benefit of trial. Colonel YU Arrives It was not until 2 March, when an overall task force commander in the person of Colonel YU Jai Hung was sent to the island, that operations against the rebels began to meet with real success. Colonel YU, the son of a Japanese Army officer and himself commander of a mortar battalion in the crack Japanese 2nd Guards Division during World War II, was executive officer of the Korean Military Academy before the assignment. He is a thoroughly capable officer and cooperates well with American advisors. He pulled troops from their billets in sea coast towns and sent them into the mountains against the guerrillas, adopted an amnesty program and called a halt to senseless killing of residents of hill-country villages. Present policy is to intern all people from the hills who either voluntarily surrender or are captured in operations. Women, children and old men for most part are placed in a refugee category, while men of combat age are thoroughly screened and propagandized before they are given a refugee status. Since the arrival of Colonel YU 300 rebels or rebel sympathizers have been killed, 1,500 prisoners have been taken, and 22 rifles and 1 pistol have been recovered. Armed rebels have been harrassed from one hiding place to another, and, aside from the ambushing of one KA platoon in a mountain pass on 9 March, the rebels have been unable either to counter-attack or mount raids on villages. The Rebel Forces It is estimated that by the summer of 1948 SOUTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY membership on CHEJU had reached a peak strength of 50,000, but actually among the politically ignorant farmers and fishermen there was little real sympathy or support for the true tenets of communism. Rather they had been persuaded that membership in the organization offered a panacea for the economic difficulties and civil unrest which was a part of the post-war period. At most a few hundred real communists furnished the core of the resistance movement, but, militant, fanatic and well-organized, they were disruptive beyond the force of their numbers. First positive indications of their strength became evident with the 10 May 1948 election. General and wide-spread rioting broke out on the island. Fifty-two civilians and several police and governmental workers were killed, and voting in 2 out of 3 Assembly districts was invalidated. At the present time there still are 2 unfilled CHEJU-DO Assembly seats. Present estimated strength of armed rebels is placed at approximately 250, who are backed by an additional 1,000 to 1,500 mountain supporters or sympathizers. Rebel locations and organization change on a day-to-day basis, but as of 27 March the best obtainable order of battle was as follows: Rebel Leaders KIM Shi Won, 35, communist party leader, a native of CHEJU with no military experience. LEE Duk Ko-, 32, leader of armed rebel troops, at one time a member of the Japanese Army. KIM Pyung Ho, formerly a lieutenant in the 9th KA Regiment, who deserted, and now heads the rebel training school, which was last located in the mountains at (958-1138). Rebel Troops and Troop Locations Rebel 12th Corps -- Located at YO:G DIM-SAW (966-1138). Consists of 100 men armed with 72 Japanese 99 rifles, 10 M-1 rifles, 15 carbines and 3 BARs. Rebel 8th Corps -- Located at SONG PAN Oram (961-1135). Consists of 100 mon, 50 of whom are unarmed. Arms possessed by the unit are 50 Japanese 99 rifles, 10 carbines and 6 M-1 rifles. Rebel 23rd Corps -- Located in mountains at (955-1132). Consists of 12 men armed with 10 Japanese 99 rifles, 1 carbine and 1 M-1 rifle. Rebel 3rd Corps -- Located at TOL Oram (944-1131). Consists of 30 men, 20 of whom are unarmed. Weapons possessed are 8 Japanese 99 rifles, 1 M-1 rifle and 1 carbine. Training Center -- Located in mountains at (958-1138). Size of contingent is small, and no more than a handfull of weapons are organic to the organization. Provincial Communist Headquarters -- Located in mountains at (955-1144). Strength estimated at about 50, only a few of whom are armed. (This headquarters was raided by KA troops on 26 March. In the raid 11 rebels were killed and 4 were captured. One rifle, a radio and a collection of spare parts for arms was confiscated.) Myon Headquarters -- There is a small communist headquarters in each of the island's 12 myon. In each headquarters there are 3 to 5 CP members who are armed with old muzzle-loading Japanese training rifles. Unarmed Rebel Supporters -- These people are scattered throughout the mountainous interior of the island and are now estimated to number between 1,000 and 1,500. Since 2 March 300 of these supporters have been killed, and 1,500 have been captured and are presently interned. Guerrilla Logistics Most pressing problem of the rebels at the present time is lack of ammunition. Captured and foraged food stocks are ample, and caves left behind by Japanese divisions make security and housing no great problem, but there is no ready source of ammunition. Three light machine guns and a mortar captured from KA troops have been buried because of the supply shortage, and present ammunition stocks, as assessed by captured rebels, consist of 800 rounds of M-1, 90 rounds of carbine and 400 rounds of Japanese 99 ammunition. Only source of supply for captured American-type weapons is that captured from Security Forces, but it is believed that the rebels possess reloading facilities for 2,000 rounds of 99 ammunition. There have been rumors that rebel forces have received logistic support by water from the mainland and from North Korea, but there is no evidence to substantiate those reports. Constant patrolling by ships of the Korean Navy, aerial reconnaissance flights and the tight ring of police in villages on the coastal plain preclude the possibility of outside support. Security Forces Security Forces presently opposing the rebels are 2,622 KA troops, 1,700 police and approximately 50,000 MIN BO DAN, a civilian defense agency. In general cooperation between police and the military is excellent, but occasionally there are reported incidents of friction in small, outlying villages, which usually can be blamed on high-handedness of soldiers belonging to units with inadequate leadership. KA Troops Troops in CHEJU are broken down into the 3 battalions of the 2nd Regiment, one understrength special battalion and one special unit of 50 men under the command of Captain KIM Myung, former S-3 of the 2nd Regiment. This small unit, dressed in civilian clothing and armed with Japanese 99 rifles, is made up of selected guerrilla fighters who prowl through the mountain country, meet rebels on their own terms and who thus far have been most valuable as an intelligence collection agency. Task Force and regimental headquarters of troops on the island are at CHEJU City (952-1152). Battalion headquarters are located as follows: 1st Battalion --PYONG TAI JIN JUN (961-1130); 2nd Battalion--KWAN UM SA (957-1142); 3rd Battalion--KYO LAE Ri (969-1141); Special Battalion--MO RO Crum (945-1135). Training of troops on the island has not advanced beyond small unit stage. Bulk of the soldiers are desirous of a speedy return to mainland duty, but their morale generally appears to be good, and all communistic elements were purged from the 2nd Regiment before it departed from TAEJON (1040-1490). Police Chief of Police on the island is HONG Sun Bong, a typical Korean Police official, who apparently is attempting to cooperate with both KA troops and American advisors. The normal complement of 1,200 police on the island, consisting of 800 native members and 400 mainlanders, has been reinforced by 500 men from mainland cities during the current period of unrest. Police for most part are concentrated in coastal towns as a security and holding force and are only used against the rebels in combined operations at the request of the Army commander. MIN BO DAN Backing both the police and Army is the MIN BO DAN, which is made up of most of the adult male population of the island and is armed with crude bamboo spears. Estimated to number approximately 50,000, they appear to prefer guard duty and anti-guerrilla operations to labor in the fields, and, since they are used directly in the line by the Army in its combing operations, casualties have been comparatively heavy among the civilian combatants. Civilian Privation As a result of cumulative rebel actions and counter-measures of Security Forces there is a tragic amount of hardship and privation among the civilian population of the island. During the past year it is estimated that 14 to 15 thousand people have been killed, at least 80 to r cent of them by Security Troops; nearly one-third of the homes on the island have been destroyed, and an estimated one-fourth of the 300,000 islanders have been dislocated from their razed villages and have been moved to coastal areas; food, clothing and medicinal stocks are low, and only in the past two weeks have relief supplies from the mainland begun to arrive in noticeable quantities. Refugees from the 45 villages which have been completely destroyed and from 43 others which have been partially razed have been moved to encampments in coastal towns. Housing for the dislocated people offers no great problem. Primary building materials, stone and mud, are in abundance all over the island, and now villages spring up overnight, but food is and will continue to be a pressing problem. During normal times CHEJU-DO is a rice deficit area, but surpluses of barley and sweet potatoes are traded with the mainland for rice supplies. Now farmers have been moved away from their plots of ground, and a large percentage of farm animals have been killed wantonly by both rebels and Security Troops. At the present time, with rebel activities suppressed, farmers have been allowed to move 8 kms inland to resume farming, but they are handicapped by the distances to their present dwellings and the reduction in draft animals. If the rebel situation remains under control, the island should again become self-sufficient in food stocks by next fall, but without continued mainland support during intervening months, there will be a definite food deficit and resultant danger of rioting and disorder. COMMENT: While the overall picture looks bright at the present time, any cessation of activities on the part of KA units likely will result in fresh outbreaks of terrorism unless in the meantime the some 250 odd armed rebels are either killed or captured or their arms are confiscated. One captured rebel leader admitted that present policy of his cohorts was to keep under cover until army troops are withdrawn, at which time raiding would be resumed. > Utilizing intelligence reports, the Korean Commander is attempting to ferret rebels from their hiding places by direct operations, but, while the guerrillas are kept on the move and have suspended their activities, no real dent has been made in the armed units. > Present plans of cleaning out the rebels entirely before mid-April appear somewhat optimistic. It may be necessary to utilize an alternate plan, which is under consideration, to form a line of Army troops and MIN BO DAN completely across the island and comb the mountains thoroughly, driving rebel troops toward a police holding force on the other end of the island. An operation of that nature in view of the distance involved and the rugged nature of the terrain could be expected to last a month, but it should be effective.